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In 1862, George Boole derived an inequality for variables that represents a demarcation line between possible and impossible
experience. This inequality forms an important milestone in the epistemology of probability theory and probability measures.
In 1985 Leggett and Garg derived a physics related inequality, mathematically identical to Boole’s, that according to them represents
a demarcation between macroscopic realism and quantum mechanics. We show that a wide gulf separates the “sense impressions”
and corresponding data, as well as the postulates ofmacroscopic realism, from themathematical abstractions that are used to derive
the inequality of Leggett and Garg. If the gulf can be bridged, one may indeed derive the said inequality, which is then clearly a
demarcation between possible and impossible experience: it cannot be violated and is not violated by quantum theory.This implies
that the Leggett-Garg inequality does not mean that the SQUID flux is not there when nobody looks, as Leggett and Garg suggest,
but instead that the probability measures may not be what Leggett and Garg have assumed them to be, when no data can be secured
that directly relate to them. We show that similar considerations apply to other quantum interpretation-puzzles such as two-slit
experiments.
1. Introduction
In 1985, Leggett and Garg [1] wrote “Despite sixty years
of schooling in quantum mechanics, most physicists have
a very non-quantum mechanical notion of reality at the
macroscopic level, which implicitly makes two assumptions.
(A1)Macroscopic realism: Amacroscopic systemwith two or
more macroscopically distinct states available to it will at all
times be in one or the other of these states. (A2) Noninvasive
measurability at the macroscopic level: It is possible, in prin-
ciple, to determine the state of the systemwith arbitrary small
perturbation on its subsequent dynamics.” Leggett and Garg
continue to state that “. . .experimental predictions of the
conjunction of (A1) and (A2) are incompatible with those of
quantum mechanics. . ..” We note here that Leggett and Garg
later added conditions other than (A1) and (A2) which are
related to counterfactual realism. We discuss counterfactual
reasoning and Bell’s theorem in a separate paper [2].
Now, thirty years later, after ninety years of schooling
in quantum mechanics, a significant body of work has been
dedicated to quantum superposition states and entanglement.
Nevertheless, there are still many physicists that do not feel
at ease with the notion of quantum superposition at the
macroscopic level. It is the purpose of the present paper
to show that (A1) and the data interpreted by using (A1)
are still separated by a wide gulf from the mathematical
abstractions and axioms used in the derivation of the
Leggett-Garg inequality. This fact was already recognized by
Boole in 1862 [3], who investigated the connection between
data and mathematical abstractions representing them. He
showed that data could be understood by usingmathematical
abstractionswithin a logical framework involving probability.
His framework is based on using “ultimate alternatives”
of possible outcomes, which are known since as Boolean
variables. Epistemologically speaking, Boole thus linked the
data (sense impressions) with the world of “ideas” to form
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a consistent whole. A necessary mathematical addition in
this “workover” of the data is probability measures attached
to the ultimate alternatives, which are initially unknowns,
as we will see in some cases unknowable. For the latter
reason, Boole resolved the question of how one can be sure
and how one can know that the chosen ultimate alternatives
and their probability measures are logically consistent with
possible experience. In the course of answering the question,
he obtained his inequality. A violation of the inequality
suggested to him that he had to look for different “ultimate
alternatives” and different probability measures, in order to
do justice to the complexity of the data.
2. Probability Theory and Boole’s Inequality
Boole distinguished clearly (i) events, occurrences of physical
nature that are recorded as data by notebook-entries such as
𝐷
𝑛
with 𝑛 = 1, 2, 3, . . . and (ii) mathematical abstractions
that describe these data in the form of two-valued variables
𝑄
𝑚
= ±1 (with𝑚 = 1, 2, 3, . . .) representing ultimate possible
alternatives, for example, “true” or “false,” up or down,
head or tail, and the like. He then established a one to one
correspondence of data 𝐷
𝑛
and mathematical abstractions
𝑄
𝑚
and assigned yet unknown probability measures, real
numbers of the interval [0, 1], to these ultimate possible
alternatives and combinations thereof.
Boole’s general procedure to eliminate these unknown
probability measures to obtain the conditions of possible
experience for the𝑄s is rather complex, but he presented also
an example for only three variables 𝑄
1
, 𝑄
2
, and 𝑄
3
(Boole
[3] used 𝑥, 𝑦, and 𝑧 instead of 𝑄
1
, 𝑄
2
, and 𝑄
3
and gave
on page 230 a specific example that included the derivation
of inequalities and equalities related to 𝑥, 𝑦, and 𝑧). In this
example, he assumed the existence of probability measures
𝜇, ], . . . with 0 ≤ 𝜇, ], . . . ≤ 1 for singles, pairs, and triples of
𝑄
1
, 𝑄
2
, and 𝑄
3
. He then eliminated these unknowns 𝜇, ], . . .
by use of logics and algebra and obtained among other results
the inequality:
⟨𝑄
1
𝑄
2
⟩ + ⟨𝑄
1
𝑄
3
⟩ + ⟨𝑄
2
𝑄
3
⟩ ≥ −1, (1)
where ⟨⋅⟩ denotes the average. Below we also will use the
notation 𝐾
𝑖𝑗
= ⟨𝑄
𝑖
𝑄
𝑗
⟩, with 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, . . . introduced by
Leggett and Garg.
This inequality for the averages may also be restated for
the Boolean variables themselves, if and only if the existence
of single, as well as pair and triple joint probabilities for 𝑄
1
,
𝑄
2
, and 𝑄
3
, is guaranteed:
𝑄
1
𝑄
2
+ 𝑄
1
𝑄
3
+ 𝑄
2
𝑄
3
≥ −1. (2)
An extensive and mathematically precise derivation of the
inequalities as related to Boole’s original paper has been given
in [4]. Inequality (1) was also given by Leggett and Garg [1].
They assumed that the existence of all probabilities including
single and joint pair and joint triple probabilities follows
immediately from (A1). (A1) tells us that the results for the
SQUID flux resembles coins inasmuch as these can only fall
on heads or tails. The existence of probability measures and
the use of algebra for the outcomes of experiments, however,
require much more as we are showing in detail.
In recent work [5], it is claimed that it is already (2), which
is often named after Leggett and Garg, that forms according
to their 1985 paper a “constraint” to measurement results.
They do, unfortunately, not specify how the mathematical
symbols 𝑄
1
, 𝑄
2
, and 𝑄
3
of their equation are defined. Our
symbols in (2) are Boole-type variables. Knee et al. treat 𝑄
1
,
𝑄
2
, and 𝑄
3
of (2) as if they were outcomes of measurements
stating that Leggett and Garg “considered 𝑄
1
, 𝑄
2
, and 𝑄
3
as
the value taken by a macroscopic observable 𝑄 measured at
three consecutive times 𝑡
1
, 𝑡
2
, and 𝑡
3
, respectively.” Clearly,
if we assume that we measure triples, such as 𝑄
1
= +1,
𝑄
2
= −1, and 𝑄
3
= −1, and if we form inequalities (2) from
these triples (i.e., we use eachmeasured value twice), then (2)
follows immediately from (A1) and cannot be violated, except
if elementary algebra is violated (see also [6]). If, on the other
hand, 𝑄
𝑖
in (2) are taken from different runs of experiments
but still represent values of measurements, then those with
the same index need to have the same value. Again, a violation
is not possible. Only if we use the same symbol𝑄
𝑖
for different
values (which is algebraically not permitted) may we have a
violation.
From this fact we conclude that Leggett and Garg as
well as Knee et al. must have considered 𝑄
1
, 𝑄
2
, and 𝑄
3
to
be just possible two valued outcomes of measurements, in
other words some form of variables as opposed to values
of these variables. In this case the single and joint pair and
triple probabilities of𝑄
1
,𝑄
2
, and𝑄
3
do not follow from (A1)
and the claim of Leggett and Garg that they do is false. To
demonstrate this fact on the basis of Boole’s work is the main
topic of this paper.
Boole realized that the “looking” at raw data and develop-
ing a view involving probability theory involve the working-
over of the raw data and the introduction of concepts.
He realized that the connection of the events of nature to
numbers is nontrivial. Onemust be able to treat𝑄s in a logical
fashion and subject them to the logical connections AND,
OR, and NOT. 𝑄s need to be Boolean-type variables. Only
in this complex way could Boole bridge the gulf between
raw data and the algebra of numbers. This bridge led also
to inequalities (1) and (2). In case of a violation of the
inequality, Boole suggested that onemust question the choice
of the ultimate alternatives, the existence and value of their
probability measures, or both.
In contrast to Boole, Leggett and Garg took it for granted
that their 𝑄s could be subjected to the logical connections
AND, OR, and NOT. They also claimed that the existence of
all probabilitymeasureswas a direct consequence of postulate
(A1). They were then left with only one option to explain a
violation of the inequality.They abandonedmacroscopic real-
ism and questioned the nature of 𝑄s as ultimate alternatives
by involving the concept of “superposition of states.” This
concept, naturally, directed them directly to the Hilbert space
of quantum theory as the only alternative, because no algebra
of numbers admits a superposition of ±1.
However, as we will see there are also ways within the
framework of macroscopic realism and “classical” probability
theory to explain or avoid inequality violations.These include
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the use of a countable infinite number of variables or indexes,
which then also necessitate the use of different probability
measures. Importantly, depending onwhether pairs or triples
are measured, in the pair case the existence of joint triple
probabilities is not necessarily guaranteed and becomes a
separate question.
It took a century until Boole’s inequality from 1862 was
rediscovered and reformulated in a very general form by
Vorob’ev [7] in 1962, who based all of his considerations
on Kolmogorov’s framework. Boole’s variables became now
Kolmogorov’s random variables with a possible range of −1 ≤
𝑄
1
, 𝑄
2
, 𝑄
3
≤ +1. Vorob’ev discovered the importance of what
he called a cyclicity when describing criteria that determine
correlations of events by a Kolmogorov probability space. For
the exact meaning of the word cyclicity we refer the reader
to the original work of Vorob’ev. For the reasoning in the
present paper it is sufficient to recognize the cyclicity from
the following fact exhibited by (2): the values of the products
of variables in the first two terms determine entirely the
values of these variables in the last term. This specific form
of cyclicity was already introduced in the work of Boole.
The interesting corollary of Vorob’ev’s work is that given
any number of variables 𝑄 one always can invoke some
topological-combinatorial cyclicity that then restricts the
possible choices of the correlations of a general set of data.
If one wishes to avoid such restrictions entirely, one needs
to use at least a countable infinite number of variables
𝑄. This is accomplished in the Kolmogorov framework
by the introduction of stochastic processes, sequences of
random variables labelled by time or space-time. The use
of general space-time dependent stochastic processes to
remove Vorob’ev cyclicities has been discussed in [8] and in
connection with counterfactual definiteness in [2]. Below we
discuss the specific stochastic process introduced by Leggett
and Garg in relation to their inequality.
3. Connecting Boole-Leggett-Garg
John Stuart Bell was next to discover independently an
inequality similar to (1). Bell’s set of assumptions and postu-
lates were different from those discussed here and included
the postulate of counterfactual definiteness [9]. Counterfac-
tual realismwas also invoked by Leggett andGarg in a defense
of their original paper [10]. They used the word “induction”
including a counterfactual explanation.We show in a separate
paper [2] that the mathematically precise use of counterfac-
tual definitenessmoves the demarcation line that the inequal-
ity represents far away from anything related to macroscopic
realism. Here, we continue to restrict ourselves to the demar-
cations of the inequality based on postulates (A1) and (A2).
To illustrate their quantum view of reality and to contrast
this view to the world view of Einstein, Leggett and Garg
considered experiments involving rf-SQUIDs, superconduct-
ing quantum interference devices.These are superconducting
rings containing one or more tunneling junctions. Leggett
andGarg state that quantummechanics predicts themagnetic
flux of such a device to oscillate back and forth between two
or more macroscopically distinct states. A simpler example
of a macroscopic two-state system would be exploded and
unexploded gun powder, where it is clear that the system will
be most of the time in one of the two states. From footnote 2
of Leggett and Garg [1], one deduces that some might reason
against such a simple analogy, and there may be reasons
that the detailed physics of the magnetic flux characterizing
these macroscopic states of SQUIDs is more complicated.
We will not deal with these problems, however, and stipulate
that Leggett and Garg indeed may describe the magnetic
flux of the SQUID by two possible macroscopic states such
as the head or the tail of a coin, which validates postulate
(A1). Claiming that the existence of all the 𝑄s probability
measures (including joint triple probabilities) follows imme-
diately from (A1), Leggett and Garg proceeded to deduce the
inequality, formally identical to Boole’s as given by (1).
In their proof, Leggett and Garg proposed the following
Gedanken experiment that they claimed could actually be
performed. They consider many rf-SQUIDs, a whole ensem-
ble of them, with unspecified location (space coordinate).
With each single one they propose to perform a “prepa-
ration” at time 𝑡
0
and subsequently measure at successive
times 𝑡
1
, 𝑡
2
, . . . , 𝑡
𝑖
, . . . to obtain results 𝑄
𝑡
1
= 𝐷
1
, 𝑄
𝑡
2
=
𝐷
2
, . . . at the respective times. This definition could indeed
represent a general (countable infinite) stochastic process
of Kolmogorov-type and remove the Vorob’ev cyclicity (the
restrictions on the correlations of the data). In actuality,
however, Leggett and Garg use only three times 𝑡
1
, 𝑡
2
, and
𝑡
3
for their proofs and do not distinguish the SQUIDs by
their location (space coordinates). They assume that for all
SQUIDs of their ensemble measurements can be performed
precisely at these three times. No distinction of the SQUIDs is
permitted that results from their spacial position and possible
interactions with the other SQUIDs. All SQUIDs are being
treated as identical except for the distinction with respect to
the three measurement times. In Kolmogorov’s language, the
data arising from all the different SQUIDs are described by
one stochastic process with only three times 𝑡
1
, 𝑡
2
, and 𝑡
3
to
label the random variables.
3.1. Macroscopic Reality and Leggett-Garg Deductions from
(A1). Leggett and Garg claim then, “It immediately follows
from (A1) that for an ensemble of systems prepared in some
way at 𝑡
0
, we can define (i) joint probability densities. . . for𝑄
to have the values 𝑄
𝑡
𝑖
at times 𝑡
𝑖
. . . (ii) correlation functions
𝐾
𝑖,𝑗
≡ ⟨𝑄
𝑡
𝑖
𝑄
𝑡
𝑗
⟩.” Their joint probability densities involve pair
and also triple probability densities for 𝑄
𝑡
1
, 𝑄
𝑡
2
, and 𝑄
𝑡
3
.
One must pause here for a moment to grasp the extent
of this claim. Leggett and Garg did not appreciate that the
joint probabilities, definitions of mathematical frameworks,
or frameworks of human logic cannot be derived from sense
impressions, from the data 𝐷
1
, 𝐷
2
, 𝐷
3
, . . . . (A1) just tells us
that there exist data arising from the recording of two distinct
sense impressions such as the heads or tails of coins and
that we are sure that heads or tails are the only possible
results of our sense impressions. There is absolutely no
direct connection of the data to the joint probabilities of 𝑄s,
mathematical idealizations of ultimate possible alternatives,
or Kolmogorov’s random variables and their assumed algebra
and probability measures. Only if we have accepted all the
facts of definition, logic, and algebra as well as a one to one
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correspondence of data and the two valued 𝑄-variables, can
we possibly check whether the data are commensurate with
our conceptual thinking. In addition, there is the question
of what actually is measured and which ultimate alternatives
describe the measurements. Are we measuring pairs or
triples? As we will see instantly, this latter question adds a
significant complication.
As a preview of these complications, consider the follow-
ing. From the viewpoint of quantum mechanics the SQUID
is assumed to be in a superposition of two flux states of
which one is realized with a certain probability, say, one-
half. Because of considerations of entanglement, however,
the probability changes as soon as the entangled partner has
been measured. This shows that in the framework of quan-
tum mechanics, we are dealing with conditional probability
measures that now must be represented by different ultimate
alternatives. Clearly one also needs to admit alternativesmore
complex than 𝑄
𝑡
1
, 𝑄
𝑡
2
, and 𝑄
𝑡
3
within a classical, Einstein
type framework. The way this can be done is shown below
and relates to dynamics and general stochastic processes.
3.2. Leggett-Garg Deductions from (A1) Plus (A2). Leggett
and Garg were aware neither of Boole’s nor of the later
work by Vorob’ev. They simply claimed that the existence
of all joint probabilities follows immediately from (A1). The
postulate (A2) just allows them to take a measurement
without influencing the system and thus they believe that
(A2) links their theory to the experiments. As we can see
from the details of their proposedmeasurements, we have the
following choices:
(i) Measure the triples of outcomes at the three times 𝑡
1
,
𝑡
2
, and 𝑡
3
and for each of the SQUIDs of the ensemble,
which are numbered by 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, . . . . For each triple
and corresponding 𝑘 we have a Boole inequality:
𝑄
𝑘
𝑡
1
𝑄
𝑘
𝑡
2
+ 𝑄
𝑘
𝑡
1
𝑄
𝑘
𝑡
3
+ 𝑄
𝑘
𝑡
2
𝑄
𝑘
𝑡
3
≥ −1. (3)
Here we are using the three variables to describe
precisely the 𝑘th SQUID at three different times. This
inequality cannot be violated in any way, not by any
interaction or even “spooky” influence.The inequality
is, therefore, also true for the average over all 𝑘. In this
case, the joint probabilities for triples are well defined
and the inequality follows indeed from (A1). It cannot
be violated and is not violated by quantum theory
[4, 11].
(ii) Measure for each SQUID just a pair of outcomes, not
the triple. For example, we could measure for 𝑘 = 1
the pair of outcomes corresponding to 𝑡
1
and 𝑡
2
, for
𝑘 = 2 the pair corresponding to 𝑡
1
and 𝑡
3
, and so
forth. No triples are measured. In this case, the Boole
inequality does not follow from (A1) and it does not
even follow from the conjunction of (A1) and (A2),
because now the expectation values are determined
by
𝑄
𝑖
𝑡
1
𝑄
𝑖
𝑡
2
+ 𝑄
𝑚
𝑡
1
𝑄
𝑚
𝑡
3
+ 𝑄
𝑛
𝑡
2
𝑄
𝑛
𝑡
3
≥ −3. (4)
Here we have involved three SQUIDs of the ensem-
ble, distinguished by the location-related labels 𝑖 =
1, 4, . . ., 𝑚 = 2, 5, . . ., and 𝑛 = 3, 6, . . ., each used
for measurements at two different times. The joint
triple events for any given SQUID are not measured
and it is unknown and unknowable (see physical
reason below) which triple probability, if any exists
at all, applies to the SQUID related to a given pair.
Therefore, the pair correlation functions and expec-
tation values may now be arbitrarily chosen from the
domain −1 ≤ 𝐾
𝑖,𝑗
≤ +1, because all the factors are, at
least in principle, different and so are, therefore, all the
ultimate alternatives and corresponding probability
measures.
How can one physically justify the introduction of so
many more ultimate alternatives? There are two ways of
justification. First, for each single SQUID we have chosen
now one of the three combinations𝑄𝑖
𝑡
1
𝑄
𝑖
𝑡
2
,𝑄𝑚
𝑡
1
𝑄
𝑚
𝑡
3
, and𝑄𝑛
𝑡
2
𝑄
𝑛
𝑡
3
and for each of these pairs we have a different combination
of time-like separations from the preparation time 𝑡
0
. This
fact opens the possibility of different dynamics for each of
the three combinations, because of their time-like differences.
Second, in addition, each SQUID is space-like separated from
all other SQUIDs and is therefore in a different environment
with respect to the possible interactions of all SQUIDs. This
interaction also depends, in general, on the actual choice of
time-like separations of the measurements of each SQUID
and is certainly different for pair and triple measurements.
Dynamics that may be underlying such types of experi-
ments have recently been discussed by Bush [12]. We hazard
no guess whether any of the dynamics discussed by him may
be identified as actual possibilities. We emphasize, however,
that according to our understanding of the present work and
that of [2] no quantum nonlocality is required and all is
Einstein local.
Additional physical justification of violations may be
possible because of certain problems with the noninvasive
measurability at the macroscopic level, as formulated in
postulate (A2), which may clearly be violated as is well
known from the Copenhagen School, because of the atom-
istic structure of the measurement equipment. Even if we
now measure a macroscopic flux and are able to make
the measurement equipment smaller and smaller to not
disturb that flux, one may run into the inverse problem:
how does the macroscopic flux of all SQUIDs influence the
smaller and smaller measurement equipment? In the final
analysis both the SQUID and the measurement equipment
do have atomistic structure and intricate dynamics [13] and,
as even Einstein admitted [14], moving away from a statistical
description of physical phenomena may be impossible.
The actual experiments proposed by Leggett and Garg
have never been performed or presented to the authors’
knowledge. A variety of related experiments have been
performed and linked to the Leggett-Garg paper. The paper
by Emary et al. [15] reviews many of such experiments up to
2013 and reports of more recent experiments can be found in
[5, 16–21].These experiments cannot, at least in the opinion of
the authors, prove anything about borders between quantum
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and classical reality, because they use the assumption of
Leggett and Garg that probability measures for singles,
pairs, and triples of measurements follow immediately from
(A1). As described above there exists an enormous gulf, an
enormous rift between (A1) and the probability measures of
𝑄s, and one cannot even guarantee from (A1) that 𝑄s follow
some algebra such as the Boolean algebra. 𝑄s that are used
to describe the experiments may not represent the ultimate
possible alternatives and underlying dynamics may require a
formidable extension of the set of ultimate alternatives.
4. General Quantum Experiments
and Leggett-Garg
The facts discussed in (i) and (ii) in Section 3.2 highlight the
well known conundrum of some interpretations of quantum
mechanics. If we measure triples, we cannot violate the
inequality [3]. On the other hand, if we measure pairs,
quantum mechanics tells us that the inequality is violated
under certain circumstances. Leggett and Garg conclude
from the fact that measuring pairs may yield a violation
of the inequality and from their assumption of noninvasive
measurement that any experimentally demonstrated viola-
tion denies the “existence” of possible outcomes that are not
measured and proves quantum superposition in our space
and time system (as opposed to being just amathematical tool
involving Hilbert space). Therefore it appears to the authors
that Leggett and Garg have answered the question stated in
the title of their paper [1] (“Is the Flux There when Nobody
Looks”) in the negative. Peres stated in the same connection
“unperformed experiments have no results.”
Knowing theworks of Boole andVorob’ev, however, we do
not need to go as far as doubting the presence of macroscopic
or even atomistic objects depending on whether or not we
“look.” Boole tells us that, in case of a violation, we have not
arrived at an understanding involving the ultimate possible
alternatives.Wemust choose more or different variables than
just 𝑄
𝑡
1
, 𝑄
𝑡
2
, and 𝑄
𝑡
3
and we may need a stochastic process
involving a countable infinite number of functions to remove
all possible Vorob’ev cyclicities. Inmore elementary terms, we
must abandon our ideas of joint triple probability measures
when we are not measuring the data in triples but only in
pairs. We thus just may need to abandon our mathematical
constructs, when the data are not commensurate with them.
The above conundrum is, of course, present in many
discussions of quantum-type experiments and is generally
just not expressed as clearly as in the case of the Leggett-
Garg Gedanken experiment. Key to the understanding of
the conundrum is the fact that it arises from an unphysical
invocation of joint occurrences or events and corresponding
triple probability measures. This fact has been covered in the
past from various points of view by [11, 22–31].
In the above example it is the assumption of the existence
of sequential triple events and probability measures, while
only pair events are actually measured for each SQUID and
a corresponding pair sample space must be constructed.
If triple measurements are not made and, if instead, we
deal with different sequential pair measurements at different
locations, then a dynamic interaction of all SQUIDs with
different interactions in different neighborhoods leads to (4)
and no obvious conundrum arises.
As another example for the unphysical invocation of joint
occurrences or events and corresponding joint probability
measures, consider the following known facts of the two-
slit experiment. We know that one measures an interference
pattern on some detector-screen if both slits are open and
that this pattern is not even remotely equal to the sum of
the patterns created with only one slit open at a time. One
quantum theory explanation is that the particle is only there,
in one particular slit, if one is looking. If one is not, then
it is in a superposition state, meaning in essence it exists
simultaneously within the confinement of both slits.
How can we resolve this situation in terms of Boole’s
probability? We must assume that there exists dynamics that
we do not observe and maybe cannot observe in its entirety.
However, the following facts alone permit an interpretation in
terms of Boole-type probability theory. A photon or electron
(or any quantum entity that approaches the two slits) starts
“shaking” all the particles constituting the material defining
the slits and causes a many-body “mayhem,” dynamics of all
the involved particles, and gauge fields. It does not matter
for the following argument whether we describe that shakeup
by the most modern quantum mechanical methods or by
the theoretical tools and methods that Einstein used. This
shakeup is naturally dynamically different if the particle
approaches only one open slit than it is when we have two
open slits.
Denote by𝑄𝑘1
𝑡
𝑖
the screen detection at time 𝑡
𝑖
and position
𝑠
𝑘
for the case when only the first slit is open. Furthermore
use 𝑄𝑘2
𝑡
𝑚
for the screen detection at time 𝑡
𝑚
when only the
second slit is open and finally𝑄𝑘12
𝑡
𝑛
for time 𝑡
𝑛
when both slits
are open. There is a fundamental problem connected to any
reasoning that combines probabilities of these occurrences in
one equation, because they happen under different physical
conditions. Yet Feynman and Hibbs [32] teach that classical
physics results in a “chance” of occurrence for the two-slit
case that equals the sum of the chances of the one-slit cases.
Thus they maintain that
⟨𝑄
𝑘
1
𝑡
𝑖
⟩ + ⟨𝑄
𝑘
2
𝑡
𝑚
⟩ = ⟨𝑄
𝑘
12
𝑡
𝑛
⟩ , (5)
where the averages ⟨⋅⟩ are taken over all 𝑖,𝑚, and 𝑛.
However, make the reasonable assumption that the par-
ticles and fields constituting the slit(s) exhibit Einstein local
many-body dynamics. It is obvious then that this dynamics
(e.g., surface plasmons involving the slit material) is different
when different numbers of slits are present and we must have
in general
⟨𝑄
𝑘
1
𝑡
𝑖
⟩ + ⟨𝑄
𝑘
2
𝑡
𝑚
⟩ ̸= ⟨𝑄
𝑘
12
𝑡
𝑛
⟩ . (6)
It is then not classical probability theory that is incompat-
ible with quantum theory [32], but it is the use of incorrect
assumptions about classical probability measures (Feynman
andHibbs used theword “chance”without precise definition)
that leads to a conundrum [33]. Note that our notation is
based on Boole-Kolmogorov’s notation with a corresponding
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space of events inmind.The difference of having one and two
slits open plays, therefore, a major role [34].
Our reasoning just is that one cannot oversimplify or
distort macroscopic realism by assuming the existence of
measurements conditional to the joint occurrence of events
that cannot jointly occur (thus technically involving con-
ditioning on impossible events, a probabilistic mistake). To
avoid contradictions and quantum nonlocalities (as opposed
to Einstein locality), one further needs to include dynamic
many body interactions in the slit material that quantum
theory does not require, because it somehow efficiently cir-
cumvents them by using probability amplitudes and Hilbert
space instead of probability measures.
If we attempt to develop a space-time picture without
involving Hilbert space, we must admit general many-body
stochastic processes, in order to avoid conundrums of the
kind described above. We are convinced that most physicists
will agree that one may regard the slit material as a many-
body quantummechanical system, consisting of particles and
fields that interact with the incoming particles and fields.
Naturally, we understand that the complete (classical or quan-
tum) many-body treatment of equipment and environment
(including the observer) leads to an infinite regress that
has to be cut off like a Gordian knot at some point. It is,
however, also our opinion that imposing such a cutoff on
“classical” type of thinking when performing Leggett-Garg-
type proofs is leading physics down the wrong path and
presents conundrums that are artificial.
The authors are convinced that these conundrums are a
consequence of some hidden dynamics that is in its essence
covered by the formalism of quantum mechanics which
provides us with suitable long term averages in spite of the
very simplified description of the measurement equipment.
The conundrum arises only if we “derive” from these long
term averages probabilitymeasures for certain oversimplified
variables (that do not represent the ultimate logical alterna-
tives that some believe they are). It is not that the alternatives
do not exist when we are not looking. We maintain that
the probability measures that are assigned in Leggett-Garg-
type proofs to these supposedly ultimate alternatives are
just incorrect and a much larger number as well as more
complicated alternatives will exist and must be used.
Leggett and Garg did realize soon after publication of
their 1985 paper [1] that their reasoning was not airtight
and proposed later the inclusion of another postulate that is
related to counterfactual realism [10].The problems with this
postulate are discussed in a separate paper [2].
5. Conclusion
Thus, if we follow the probability theory of Boole carefully,
no quantum conundrum arises. We only need to postulate
that we have not arrived at the precise ultimate alternatives
and their probability measures. Different physics related
labels may characterize 𝑄s and we cannot attach probability
measures and postulate the existence of joint probabilities
if the data do not support the existence of such joint
probabilities.The same reasoning applies to approaches using
the probability theory of Kolmogorov.We just need to remove
the Vorob’ev cyclicities by use of stochastic processes and
introduce additional space and time (or space-time) labels for
𝑄s in order to avoid conflicts with quantum theory.
For the example of the two-slit experiment, this means
that we cannot assign probability measures for detection on
a screen by considering each single slit separately and inde-
pendently. If both slits are open, the many-body interactions
of incoming particles and fields with the quantum entities of
the slit material necessitate different indexing and time labels
for the cases of two slits simultaneously open or just one slit
open during separate anddifferent time periods.Thequestion
throughwhich slit a particle propagates is more appropriately
replaced by the question ofwhichmany-body interactions the
incoming particle undergoes.
In the opinion of the authors, Peres’ well known enun-
ciation “unperformed experiments have no results” should
be replaced by the following statement: “unperformed exper-
iments must not be associated with random variables and
probability measures that lead to contradictions with the
actual available data and thus to contradictions with macro-
scopic realism.”
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